How theaterisation can be done the right way – The Tribune
Media inputs indicate that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan, has submitted the roadmap for setting up theatre commands to Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. 'Theaterisation' or the reorganisation of the Indian military into triservices' 'integrated theatre commands' is nearing realisation.
This would possibly be the most profound re-organisation of India's military since Independence. Astonishingly, it was written into policy, not on the basis of any detailed internal, broad-based study that established its need, but essentially on a 'narrative'. Public discourse slowly established that theaterisation was the solution for lack of jointness among India's defence services. This gained momentum with China's establishment of theatre commands in 2016. Eventually, this became a policy commitment when it was written into the charter of the CDS.
At this time, it may be prudent to pay special attention to some critical aspects before the proposal is firmed up.
Firstly, theatres should ideally be strategic constructs. That is, the actual detailed planning of military operations in each of the three domains of land, air and sea must still be done by the domain specialist 'operational' commanders (like the heads of the various single service commands at present). The theatre commander's role must be that of someone who provides the overarching strategic guidance, ensuring jointness in planning and finally resolving dissonance if any. He must add balance and ensure cooperation and coordination, rather than take over operations planning himself. An Air Marshal planning a sea campaign will be as much 'at sea' as a General planning an air campaign will be 'in a spin'!
Secondly, by usage and practice, theatres have generally been large in geographical expanse. Consequently, they have usually also been geographically distinct. Certainly, the US model indicates this. But, most models in the Indian discourse proposed four or more theatres, reducing the areas of responsibility and the resources available for all theatres and directly feeding the IAF's insecurities of being split up into 'penny packets'. Such delineation would also require necessary inter-theatre application of forces, defeating the very purpose of theaterisation.
Thirdly, land and sea operations have generally had very little overlap in the Indian context, with amphibious operations being the exception. This lack of overlap and possibly of knowledge of the other type of operations manifests in all visualisations of theatre commands. Inter-theatre boundaries have invariably cleaved the battlespace against Pakistan into two, separating the continental and oceanic domains. Such designs are inherently disjoint. The designation of the 'Maritime Theatre' further reinforces the disconnect. It denies India the considerable benefits from a synergised campaign design under one theatre commander. In this era of multiple levels of threats below the threshold of outright war, every element of national power needs to explore avenues to provide rapid response options to the country. But a formal 'maritime' designation of the southern theatre will channelise naval thought away from land. Non-traditional usage of future naval platforms with credible long-range land attack capability for providing a 'first' or even 'instant' response options is likely to be precluded.
Lastly, in both the US and Chinese models, the command line of theatre commanders who command field forces and the advice line of service chiefs who are tasked with raise, train and sustain functions merge in a political functionary. In the US, it is the Secretary of War and in China, it is the Central Military Commission whose chair is the President. In India, open-source chatter has somehow put the CDS at the confluence of both these channels. In addition, secretarial powers too have been vested in him, potentially creating an all-powerful 'generalissimo' without precedent.
So what can be done to address these issues?
If available inputs are to be believed, theatre commanders will be four-star ranks. This automatically puts them at the strategic level of command, with protocol and charter (hopefully) to engage with all organs of government and society while operational commanders concentrate on specialist planning. They would link theatre-level military strategy to national strategy. This is a good development.
By limiting to three theatres, the problem of 'penny packets' stands addressed to some extent. However, care must be taken when deciding Areas of Responsibility (AsOR), to use 'breaks' and make theatres as geographically distinct as possible. Nepal provides one such break. The Myanmar-Bangladesh expanse provides the other. Using them as inter-theatre boundaries will minimise inter-theatre operations to the extent possible. It will also give necessary 'depth' of great relevance to the IAF with bases in multiple tiers.
The third aspect is possibly the litmus test of whether the theatres are actually 'joint' or just 'joined'. Decision-makers must aim for a truly joint framework, especially for the Western Theatre Command. Naval operations within 800-to-1,000 km of the Pakistan coast must be handled by the western theatre command as these would require close coordination with air and land operations. Naval operations further beyond, and on the entire eastern seaboard could be with the southern theatre command. This may well require the placement of some elements of the western naval command under the western theatre command or a mechanism for transfer of control between commands, if and when operations shift closer to land.
The last aspect needs a giant leap of faith on the part of the political leadership. They must shed hesitation and the merge between the command and advice lines must happen in the Raksha Mantri (RM). Provided theatres are modelled as given earlier, minimal inter-theatre real-time coordination would be needed. Most decisions would be regarding strategic resource allocation, for which a degree of strategic guidance is needed anyway. This is best done by the RM with due advice from the Chiefs, VCDS and CDS.
These reforms will have far-reaching ramifications. As the proposal goes into review by the Ministry of Defence bureaucracy, and then the political leadership, careful evaluation and deliberate action keeping these points in mind would serve India well.
Key Insights
- This topic is currently trending
- Experts are closely monitoring developments
- It may impact future decisions
